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ABSTRACT
The construction of offshore facilities for development of oil and gas deposits is preceded by careful 
Conceptual Studies, Front-End Engineering Design Studies (FEED studies) and a Detailed Engineering 
phase including accurate construction planning. Still, incidents during the Construction Phase could 
lead to needs for implementation of physical strengthening of construction details or changes to the 
construction process. These incidents could emerge from information coming from the construction of 
other facilities, detection of design errors or aspects which were overseen during the engineering phase. 
Serious consequences, like loss of assets or fatalities, could occur in case the unexpected information 
was not assessed and changes were not implemented.
In this paper, we report on how the design and construction processes were adjusted during the 
construction phase of the largest of the North Sea platforms, the Troll offshore gas production facilities, 
as new information became available while the platform was in the construction phase.
The assessment of all incoming information and implementation of mitigating measures led to the 
successful construction, installation and start-up of gas production from the platform. Of particular impor-
tance for the success was the open attitude by the operator of the construction project to allow for voicing 
of concerns from companies hired to do veriﬁcation, external reviewers and from project personnel.
The lessons learned during the construction of these facilities could be very useful for those 
involved in the design and construction of large projects, in particular in offshore oil and gas projects 
where the forces due to waves and currents and the strains due to bending and pressures are not always 
well known initially.
The paper is concluded by a recommendation to listen to those presenting warnings to project 
management during project execution (including the detailed engineering and construction phases).
Keywords: Construction risk analysis, Early warnings, Handling of bad news in a project,  Implementation 
of concerns from lower level specialists, Management challenges, North Sea gas, Ringing phenomena, 
Loss of the Sleipner concrete Platform, Troll concrete platform, Use of GRP piping.
1 INTRODUCTION
The Troll ﬁeld is the largest gas ﬁeld in the North Sea. The ﬁeld is located in the Northern 
North Sea. The gas is being produced through a large ﬁxed concrete gravity base platform 
located at the ﬁeld in 305 m water depth. At the platform, gas is produced, dried and com-
pressed and sent to onshore process facilities located at Kollsnes, 65 km to the west. The gas 
production started in 1995 from the reservoir located 1400 m below sea ﬂoor. The production 
is kept up by recent installation of compression units on-board the platform.
The Troll ﬁeld also contains a relatively thin layer (22–26 m) of oil underneath the gas 
column and the oil is produced from two ﬂoating rigs. The total investments in the ﬁeld devel-
opment (actual and planned) are in the range 40 billion US $ [1]. In 2018, the total production 
from the ﬁeld was 46 MSm3 of oil equivalents. It is expected that the ﬁeld could continue to 
produce gas until year 2100. Original reserves were in terms of MSm3 oil equivalents as fol-
lows: oil: 285.7, gas: 1432.2, NGL: 45.6, condensate: 1.5. The Norwegian government has 
recently approved plans for production to year 2050 [2], whereby 2.2 billion barrels of oil 
equivalents can be produced.
The licence was awarded to a consortium with A/S Norske Shell as operator in 1979. The 
reservoir was conﬁrmed later in 1979. The ﬁeld was declared commercial in 1983 following 
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reservoir conﬁrmation and conceptual engineering studies. After construction/ platform 
installation, Equinor (formerly Statoil) took over as ﬁeld operator in 1996. The Shell group 
has still a large equity (8.1%) in the ﬁeld.
2 PROJECT MANAGEMENT ISSUES
Complex engineered projects may face technical or managerial challenges that could lead to 
failures or disasters. There are several reasons why this could happen:
?? In several projects the technical concept is not sufﬁciently engineered when project execution 
starts, so conceptual engineering must continue into the project execution phase  (including 
the detailed engineering and construction phases) where the time pressure normally is an 
issue. The Yme project on the Norwegian shelf [3] is an example of a project where the 
increased topsides of the production jackup structure grew to such an extent that the natural 
period of the structure came into resonance with a large number of waves. Fatigue damage 
resulted. The structure became unsuitable for the purpose and had to be removed (scrapped) 
from the offshore site at huge costs, even before any barrel of oil was produced.
 ? In other cases, the handover from the Concept Engineering team and/or the Front-End 
Engineering (FEED) team to the Project Execution team is not thorough. This could eas-
ily lead to implementation of misunderstandings or undesirable technical solutions. An 
example of such case, is a semisubmersible offshore production unit that was optimized 
in the FEED phase by specifying that the living quarter module should be built in alumin-
ium. The project, however, ordered the cheaper steel living quarter whereby the additional 
weight of steel over aluminium caused the need for larger buoyancy and thereby gave rise 
to larger anchor forces acting on the structure.
 ? Projects implementing new technologies or representing extension of state of art 
 technology must, through the project execution, keep alert to ensure that no unknown fac-
tors are overseen.
?? Challenging situations could easily be caused in case of overconﬁdence by the manage-
ment team in trusting their own assessments; in this case, there would be no listening to 
concerns from external reviewers or from internal project staff.
A comprehensive review of early warning signs in complex projects has been carried out 
by Williams et al. [4]. They discuss why early warning signs often are overseen and conclude 
that such type of information normally represents a disruption to the project execution plan. 
The discussion has been further detailed by Haji-Kazemi et al. [5] who have reported on 
barriers that hinder response to early warning signs. They conclude that ‘barriers may develop 
due to organizational factors, such as project managers’ optimism bias, the normalization of 
deviance within an organization, and the lack of an outside view’.
The inquiries following disasters show that in many cases there were individuals who may 
have spoken up, but been overruled [6]. Some project persons, therefore, decide to go public 
with their concerns. They are called ‘whistleblowers’ and may be prosecuted, even if their 
information causes changes in the project so a disaster is avoided. In the case of severe tech-
nical or organizational problems in a project, the company management in cooperation with 
the project management should react positively at an early stage to early warnings and shift 
attention from embarrassment to careful considerations of the ‘bad news’ being voiced. The 
results could be a project getting back on schedule and on planned costs, while technical 
issues (potentially causing large failures) are resolved.
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Therefore, also in later project phases, issues that could lead to failures must be investi-
gated, even if such investigations could lead to delays and additional project costs. In the 
following sections, we report on how challenging information was assessed and incorporated 
into one of the largest engineered projects in Norway, the Troll gas production platform.
It must be noted that if a project ‘cannot afford safety’, the costs of an accident, a failure 
or even a disaster could be more than the company could manage. In this respect, it is sufﬁ-
cient to mention the Challenger disaster [8] inﬂuencing strongly on the perception of NASA 
and the Deepwater Horizon disaster [9] that totally changed the way BP, one of the world 
largest corporations, sees the risk picture.
3 THE DEVELOPMENT AND CONSTRUCTION OF THE TROLL OFFSHORE 
FACILITIES
The Troll gas production unit was initially planned to produce sales gas at the ﬁeld from a 
huge ﬁxed production unit. A bottom supported ﬁxed unit was selected as technology for 
risers, having sufﬁcient size to produce the very large amounts of gas, were not available at 
the time of project approval.
Due to the large water depth at the location (305 m), the platform natural period (of about 5 
s) would get in resonance with the energetic part of the wave spectrum. Furthermore, the huge 
facilities required (close to 50,000 tonnes topsides equipment) would be very costly to install 
offshore. It was therefore decided [9] to dry the gas offshore and send the gas and NGL/con-
densate to shore facilities for full processing to sales gas and NGL. The pipelines from the 
platform to shore had to be injected with Mono-Ethylene-Glycol (MEG) to avoid the formation 
of free water that could cause corrosion. This simpliﬁed the topsides facilities and the princi-
ples developed for the Sleipner gas/condensate platform, further south in the North Sea could 
be applied [10]. Through this simpliﬁcation, the topsides weight was reduced to 22,500 tonnes.
During the engineering phase of the concrete gravity platform that supports the topsides 
facilities [11], several ingenious technical aspects were introduced:
?? A foundation system consisting of 30 m long open skirts was developed to ensure that the 
weight of the structure and the loads caused by waves and currents were transferred down 
to competent soils at 30 m below mudline.
 ? Four vertical columns/legs were designed to support the topsides, these columns were kept 
connected (by a ‘Rigel’) at mid height (150 m below surface) to reduce the total displace-
ment of the columns at the surface level and at the connections of the columns to the deck/the 
topsides equipment, thereby reducing stresses in columns and at connections to the topsides.
 ? The topsides area was ﬁxed supported to the two columns at the outer edges, while the 
topsides were elastically supported by the centre columns; thus, forces transmitted to the 
deck structure were minimized.
 ? The concrete design was optimized, using high density concrete (concrete quality C70) 
and light weight aggregate (near to the top of the columns) to reduce the weight of the 
upper part of the columns (and thus reducing the height of the centre of gravity of the 
platform during the tow-out to the ﬁeld).
 ? The required concrete cover of the steel rebars was tested to ensure corrosion resistance through-
out the estimated 70 years of lifetime of the platform (later the platform was epoxy painted in 
the waterline to ensure that water would not penetrate to the steel rebar reinforcement).
 ? A technical team with engineers from the Shell group and Statoil worked with the 
 contractors to ensure that all aspects of the design were covered.
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?? An independent company (Det Norske Veritas) was hired to review/verify all design 
 calculations.
The concrete construction started in a dry dock near Stavanger in July 1991 and the 
 platform was towed to the offshore site in July 1996. The platform base was constructed in 
the dry dock; thereafter, the base part of the structure was towed to a deep-water site (Vats in 
northern part of the Rogaland County) where the columns were slip-formed. While con-
struction proceeded, the platform was submerged to keep the working platform at 
reasonable height above the sea level to allow for access by personnel.
In parallel with the concrete platform construction, the steel deck and drilling/production 
facilities were ﬁnalized. All parts were then moved to a deep fjord near the Aker Stord con-
struction yard for ﬁnal mounting of the deck onto the concrete part and for commissioning of 
all facilities. Following the tow to the offshore site (Fig. 1), the fully operational platform 
immediately started to drill production wells and gas production started in September 1996.
4 INCIDENTS INFLUENCING THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE TROLL OFFSHORE 
CONCRETE GRAVITY BASE PLATFORM
As the construction of the Troll concrete gravity platform advanced, several challenging 
 situations appeared and new information became available, [12]:
In parallel with construction of the Troll gravity base structure, A/S Norske Shell, as oper-
ator for the Draugen offshore oil ﬁeld in the Norwegian Sea constructed a mono-tower 
concrete gravity structure for the development of this ﬁeld located in 270 m water depth. The 
topsides facilities were in the order of 30,000 tonnes. During the construction phase, ﬁnal 
Figure 1:  Towing the Troll concrete gravity platform to the offshore site 
throughout Norwegian fjords (Picture: Equinor/Statoil).
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wave model tests of the Draugen platform were carried out in the wave tank at Marintek in 
Trondheim to conﬁrm the wave loading and the design. The reasons for conducting these last 
minutes tests were that large dynamic oscillations were identiﬁed during the ongoing design 
of tension leg platforms (TLPs) for deep-water applications, [13]. These tests, unfortunately, 
showed that the Draugen platform experienced very large oscillations in case of large waves. 
These oscillations were characterized as being of a ‘ringing’/transient type. The associated 
stresses in the Draugen mono-tower were much higher (up to 70% in certain cross-sections) 
than the original design had accounted for.
The problem was solved by making the slender part of the platform (penetrating the sea 
surface) higher/longer than the original design, whereby the load attracted on the column 
from the waves was reduced. Note that the column had to be widened to a larger square area 
at the top to support the deck/topsides. Furthermore, the amount of reinforcement was 
increased along the vertical column.
The ringing phenomenon is regarded as a higher order nonlinear response phenomenon 
caused by steep and large waves [14, 15]. The ringing phenomenon identiﬁed in the model 
tests was conﬁrmed as an actual phenomenon during an incident the ﬁrst year after the 
 platform was installed at site [16].
Furthermore, Statoil was during the same period in the process of ﬁnalizing the construc-
tion of the Sleipner A gas/condensate gas production platform for 80 m water depth to be 
located in the central North Sea. The project was considered a state of art construction project 
as the platform was the twelfth in a series of concrete gravity platforms being constructed by 
the company Norwegian Contractors for the North Sea. Therefore, much efforts were imple-
mented to reduce the costs of the gravity base platform. The deck and topsides facilities, on 
the other hand, were given much attention with implementation of a safe large module layout 
arrangement for the production equipment [10].
However, on August 23rd 1991, during a controlled ballasting operation in preparation for 
transferring the deck over the platform (‘deck mating’), the Sleipner platform sank. All per-
sons on-board the platform at the time were fortunately rescued by nearby boats. The sinking 
resulted in a series of investigations and laboratory tests [17]. It was concluded that the loss 
was caused by a design failure in a cell wall, resulting in a serious crack and a subsequent 
major leakage. The wall failed as a result of an error in the ﬁnite element analysis (triangular 
ﬁnite elements were used in a high stress zone (Fig. 2), even if the FEM program manual 
(Nastran) warned about the use of such elements in highly stressed areas).
The failure of the analysis led to 47% underestimation of shear stresses in a critical region 
and subsequently to insufﬁcient reinforcement and insufﬁcient anchorage of the reinforce-
ment in the critical zone. As soon as the investigation was concluded, the construction of a 
second Sleipner A was started, this time, with sufﬁcient reinforcement and with careful steel 
stirrups reinforcement keeping the rebars connected across the cross-section of the concrete 
wall in all critical sections of the platform.
The failures causing the Sleipner A sinking could be seen as the result of the optimizing 
process:
?? The concept report (the pre-engineering report) called for very thorough design reviews 
of critical areas of the foundation caisson where circular foundation cells were joined by 
triangular geometry cells, tri-cells. This was emphasised because there had been an inci-
dent with another concrete platform (Statfjord A) where leakages in these critical sections 
were observed.
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 ? The design team was not fully familiar with the ﬁnite element program, the Nastran FEM 
program, having used the SESAM Finite Element program previously. Note that there 
were savings by selecting the Nastran code (the leasing costs of this program were lesser 
that the previously used FEM program).
 ? The company in charge of the independent veriﬁcation of the design suggested that it would 
be necessary with separate FEM analysis of critical regions of the platform. This suggestion 
was not approved by the operator as a change order, as the project was in a cost saving mode.
?? The standard internal checking of stresses by use of simpliﬁed beam models is not carried out.
It should be noted that the warnings by those in charge of the pre-engineering and the sug-
gestions by the company in charge of the independent veriﬁcation were considered, however, 
not implemented as suggested. The link between the project management and the lower level 
engineering staff and the independent reviewers did not work as needed in this project, 
 causing a 600-million-dollar loss.
Following the loss of the platform, a new platform with the same geometry, however, with 
proper reinforcement was constructed. One of the partners in the licence involved themselves 
strongly by sending one of their most experienced engineers, specializing in concrete design, 
to join the project group.
5 ADJUSTMENTS DURING THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE TROLL PLATFORM
The project management of the Troll construction project was following closely the progress 
of the other ongoing platform construction projects. This resulted in immediate actions:
?? The potential for ringing response was checked out by additional wave tank tests and all 
measures already implemented for the Draugen design were implemented for the Troll 
platform.
 ? The tri-cell design was given particular attention and the anchoring between the outer and 
inner reinforcement in the walls were increased
?? A separate independent project group was established to carry out construction risk analy-
sis of the entire construction, tow and installation process. The team was given access to all 
design, construction and maritime documentation [18, 19]. The team had all the way until 
ﬁnal installation at the site the best possible cooperation with the construction  management 
and the parent organization (Shell International in The Hague, The Netherlands).
Figure 2: Failure in design of tri-cells of the Sleipner A platform.
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6 ANOTHER ISSUE ARISING THAT COULD HAVE SUNK THE TROLL 
PLATFORM DURING THE CONSTRUCTION PHASE
Late during the construction of the Troll platform another design issue arose: During transfer 
of the deck onto the platform, the deck was to be located on barges, to be positioned 
between the columns. The platform had therefore to be submerged to a level where the 
deck on the barges could pass over the top of the columns. This submergence would 
result in huge water pressure on the platform structure, particularly on the two dry 
outer columns and the lower parts of the other columns, which, during this operation 
were only to be partially water filled. After the deck was in place above the shafts, water 
was to be pumped out of the columns, whereby the deck load was gradually to be trans-
ferred from the barges onto the columns of the platform. Parts of the platform would 
experience their highest loads during this phase.
In order to facilitate the ballasting operations, the installation at the ﬁeld, and the ultimate 
removal of the platform from the site after the production period, ballast pipes were cast into 
the lower domes of the foundation cells and in the bottom of the columns. As the platform 
was initially designed for a 70-year life, it was decided early in the project to use pipes made 
of glass-ﬁber reinforced epoxy (GRVE), as some of these pipes (those for platform removal) 
had to be designed for the maximum life of the platform. GRVE would provide maximum 
corrosion resistance and was also thought to provide maximum safety during all project 
phases. For further protection, some of the pipes located in the bottom of the columns were 
protected against dropped objects with a concrete cover, Fig. 3.
Traditionally, ductile steel had been used for the different types of pipes in concrete plat-
forms, but GRVE was selected for this application because of the very long service life 
requirement of the pipes to be used for platform removal. The GRVE pipe material speciﬁed 
for these temporary pipes in the concrete structure was relatively new for this type of struc-
ture, and therefore, it was difﬁcult to establish a safety factor for this application. Previous 
unpublished test results, however, gave some cause for concern.
Late in the construction phase it became evident that there could be a risk of pipe leakage 
due to the possibility of clipping the 2” and 8” glass-ﬁber reinforced composite pipes in the 
riser and utility columns (the outer edge columns) of the concrete platform during submer-
gence testing and deck transfer. Clipping would result from movement between the structural 
Figure 3:  Section of the lower dome of the concrete platform, showing 
GRVE pipes and protective concrete [20].
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concrete in the lower domes and the non-structural protective concrete above. Eventually, the 
clipping could result in loss of the platform due to rapid ﬂooding of these shafts, causing the 
platform to sink. At this time, the loss of Sleipner A during the submergence phases was fresh 
in the mind of all involved in the project. The probability of clipping with resulting leakage 
of one or several of the 8 inches GRVE pipes in the concrete platform was estimated to be 
2.6 × 10−1 as calculated using the PROBAN software [20]. The failure probability of each 
individual GRVE pipe was deﬁned as the probability that the local clipping displacement 
each pipe was exposed to was larger than the clipping capacity for this pipe.
A warning was immediately raised by the test contractor (veriﬁcation company) checking 
the capacity of the GRVE piping. An organizational analysis of the decision-making, the 
level of concern amongst those involved and the estimated risk has been reported by Lakats 
et al. [20], using methods described in Ref. [21]. Interviews and discussions were conducted 
with several of the persons involved, including persons from multiple organizations and at 
multiple levels of authority. The organization can be described in terms of the key communi-
cations that took place in the case. The communication paths can be summarized as a social 
network [22], as shown in Fig. 4.
Nodes represent individuals or groups involved in the communication, while arrows 
indicate communication links. Nodes are labeled with a three-digit code: the ﬁrst digit reﬂects the 
organization to which the person belongs: 1 = test contractor, 2 = operator, 3 = operator parent 
company, 4 = partner company, 5 = construction contractor and 7= government agency. The sec-
ond number indicates the persons relative position in their organization (a lower number represents 
higher level in the organization, while an underscore indicates a group of hierarchical level. The 
third number is used to distinguish persons at the same level in the same organization.
The merged arrow from 261 and 264 to 251 indicates that the subordinates communicated 
their views separately, but 251 considered these communications as an aggregate. Where 
more than one communication was received, numbers above arrows indicate the order in 
which they were received. Generally, it was assumed that communication within the same 
 organization occurred before communications from external sources.
Due to strong warnings from persons 561 and 481 supported by 261 and 264 as well as 
391, the project organization concluded that action was necessary at a rather high extra cost 
to the project to reduce the risk of sinking to a very low level [20]: a large number of the 
vulnerable ballast pipes were plugged, and the platform was submerged only to a minimum 
level during platform commissioning phase at the Stord Yard prior to tow to offshore site.
Figure 4: Communication Paths for GRVE Failure Case [20].
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‘Of significant importance was the loyalty and trust within the organization. Often, it is 
the lower level individuals who recognize the severity of a problem. Without trust in the 
judgments of subordinates, the hierarchy would block communication of warnings, so that 
decision makers may lack an accurate perception of the risk on which to base their deci-
sions. At lower levels of the hierarchy, communication among colleagues (both within 
and across organizations) allows personnel to confirm their concerns regarding potential 
risks, and provides them with the confidence in their  judgments to communicate their 
concerns to superiors when warranted. This combination of reinforcement at lower levels 
and trust in subordinates creates an environment that is conducive to the communication of 
critical warnings. Inclusion of all of the organizations in the communication process cre-
ated more pathways for the warning to reach decision makers, significantly increasing the 
likelihood of action being taken’ [20].
7 LESSONS LEARNED THAT COULD BE IMPLEMENTED IN CURRENT 
CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS
The discussion presented regarding the management of challenges during the construction of 
offshore facilities documents the importance of following contemporary activities and adjust 
design and processes and implement any warning signals. The warning may arise from veriﬁ-
cations or reviews and also from lower level personnel in the organization. As the most 
experienced engineers of an organization often are given specialist tasks to address uncertain-
ties, their concerns must be very carefully addressed [23]. Warning signs cannot be neglected 
in an organization or in a project [24], even if the information is bothersome and represents ‘bad 
news’, additional work, potentially schedule delays and additional costs for the project [25].
We have documented how the management involved during the construction of the Troll 
gas platform for the North Sea implemented all concerns being transferred from other ongo-
ing projects. The management also implemented warning signs voiced by the independent 
review team. These warning signs were strengthened by the project staff (including the group 
carrying out the project construction risk analysis) and the warnings reached the project man-
agement who was capable of implementing the concerns raised. Then, the project could 
continue until successful platform installation.
We have, furthermore, in the paper documented the management process and have empha-
sised on the working conditions in a project where the different levels of decision makers 
were in good and respectful communication.
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